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Book Review
Karen Ho, Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street. Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2009, pp. 392, $89.95.
Reviewed by Nancy Reichman
In her book Liquidated Karen Ho offers her readers a unique, insightful, and 
engaging picture of the everyday work world of investment bankers who did 
the deals to finance corporate America at the turn of the twentieth century. An 
anthropologist, Ho digs deeply into the everyday experiences of investment 
bankers, including the “origin myths” that contextualized those experiences, 
to expose how a culture of liquidity shaped the orientation of investment banks 
and in turn, the corporations that they capitalized. Her fieldwork takes place 
at a time when “the economy experienced not only record corporate profits and 
the longest rising stock market ever, but also record downsizings” (1, emphasis 
in the original). It is this fundamental contradiction between corporate profit 
and employee insecurity that drove her research. Although her ethnographic 
work preceded the current global financial crisis, Ho’s analysis takes on added 
importance when refracted through that lens, providing important insights 
into the everyday work routines that fueled recklessness and misfeasance, if 
not malfeasance, in the financial industry.
Although lawyers are not an explicit part of Ho’s ethnography, the 
longstanding relationship between investment banking and elite law firms 
and lawyers makes this an important read. Not only are investment banks 
important law firm clients, some lawyers worked directly for investment banks 
(Robert Rubin is one notable example), and for a time, many more aspired 
to do so. The parallels between investment banking and law, while not exact, 
are close enough to warrant careful attention and offer additional insights and 
questions for our understanding of the legal profession.
In 1996, Ho used her own elite academic connections to secure a management 
consultant position with a Wall Street firm that would allow her to learn more 
about finance before returning to graduate school to write about Wall Street 
culture and its relationship to corporate downsizing. After six months at her 
“prefieldwork” site, she was “downsized.” Her “actual fieldwork” took place 
after she was let go from her position and included interviews, some shadowing 
of bankers, formal and informal networking events, and attendance at industry 
conferences from 1996–1999. Although the analysis is updated to offer insight 
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into the current financial crisis, readers must be mindful that the Wall Street 
culture Ho describes predates the crisis by nearly a decade. Still, those seeking 
to make sense of the global financial crisis and how so many “smart” people 
could make such drastic mistakes will find some answers in Ho’s work.
Employing the perspective of Bourdieu’s habitus, Ho demonstrates that the 
orientation of Wall Street financiers was shaped by their elite education, on 
the one hand, and the compensation practices and job insecurity of their own 
employment, on the other. Rewarded for doing deals while ever mindful of 
the fragility of their employment at any given time, the Wall Street financiers 
Ho studied projected their orientation for the liquidity of everything on to the 
economy as a whole. Taken in by a culture that manufactured a sense of their 
“greatness,” bankers attempted to shape the economy in their own images. 
Ironically, by 2008, investment banks were experiencing the dislocation and 
restructuring they were recommending for corporate America a decade earlier.
Two chapters of the book are devoted to making sense of the narrative of 
shareholder value first as a political and cultural strategy and second, as a 
meaning system that investment bankers used to make sense of the world. 
Although readers might find this hard going, what distinguishes this part of 
the book is Ho’s anthropological perspective on the rich secondary material 
about the ascendance of shareholder value, the moment when shareholders 
“symbolized and ‘stood in’ for the whole of the corporation and became the sole locus of concern 
and analysis” (175, emphasis in the original). Ho argues that shareholder value, 
as a particular, albeit now dominant, analytic strategy reinforced a particular 
set of Wall Street interests and, in turn, workplace structures and strategies. 
While this part of the book is important in demonstrating that many so-called 
“core values” of the market are historically situated and socially produced, the 
originality of Ho’s analysis comes through in her telling of how these “myths” 
become actualized in the working world of investment banks.
Elite pedigrees and the culture of smartness. Ho was a graduate student 
at Princeton, one of a handful of “Ivies” from which Wall Street firms 
systematically recruit. Her own experience and interviews with her co-workers 
demonstrate that firms were recruiting general smartness rather than a set 
of technical skills or, even more than, as we suspect to be true in law, social 
connections. Although not discounting the value of social capital, particularly 
the alumni and peer networks that develop from elite education, Ho’s work 
emphasizes the significance of the cultural capital elites bring not simply in 
terms of habits and tastes but in terms of generic smarts, the kind of smartness 
that “conveys a naturalized and generic sense of ‘impressiveness,’ of elite, 
pinnacle status and expertise which is used to signify, even prove, investment 
bankers’ worthiness” (40, emphasis added). Technical skills could be learned 
on the job. The recruitment process itself combined with orientation sessions 
once hired to construct the “hegemonic elitism that produces the ‘expert’ 
knowledge of financial markets” (41). Rankings among elite universities were 
replicated on the street. Whereas Princeton and Harvard graduates were 
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assumed to have what it takes to succeed on Wall Street, recruits from the 
other Ivies had to demonstrate a particular ability or set of skills. Overall, 
the recruitment process created a mutually reinforcing connection between 
the market and the Ivy League. The logic went like this: Since Wall Street 
recruited the best and the brightest, the decisions and deals emanating from 
investment banks had significant value simply because they (the products of 
elite Ivies) did them. The global financial crisis may have exposed the fallacy of 
such assumptions. Nevertheless, Ho’s nuanced understanding of the value of 
elite pedigrees on Wall Street may inform ongoing debates about the value of 
elite legal education in the legal profession. The ability to attract the “best and 
the brightest,” whatever that actually means in terms of actual skills or even 
connections, is likely to remain an important source of power in a profession 
that seeks to remain elite.
Overwork as Normative Practice. Lawyers may relate closely to Ho’s 
discussion of the rigorous hours and competitive atmosphere of the Wall 
Street investment banks. Expectations for 24-hour client management coupled 
with the need to cater to more senior banker’s schedules meant that analysts 
and associates were at the office well past midnight on a regular basis. The 
culture of overwork, fueled by organizational/lifestyle perks such as dinner 
and a car service ride home, combined with the culture of smartness to justify 
the power and dominance of the Wall Street firms, at least to those who 
worked there. Deals were good, indeed right, because smart bankers worked 
very hard to get them done (107). The grueling pace of work also justified 
the hierarchies within investment banks as well as between investment banks 
and other economic actors. Although Ho recognizes a cultural imperative to 
“hard work” where women and minorities were offered different opportunities 
to prove themselves as hard workers and did not receive the same value for 
the hard work they performed, she suggests that working hard, in general, 
was a key cultural prop to support short-term finance capitalism.1 “The hard 
work needed to forge the smart ‘men of mettle’ who serve as a disciplinary 
exemplar of the new prototype of worker under short-term financial capitalism 
is itself calibrated on the bodies of unmarked investment bankers”(121). Young 
associates at large elite law firms will likely find that they can relate directly to 
this analysis.
Compensating Liquidity. The Wall Street Ho entered was characterized 
by “drastic and sometimes simultaneous spikes of hiring and firing” (225), a 
pattern that persists today. By making sense of their job insecurity as a natural 
consequence of unstoppable market forces, Ho’s Wall Street bankers forged 
their identity with the market. As there was no job security, the focus was 
always on the immediate present. “If you can’t make money today, you are out 
of there” (234, emphasis added). Indeed, Wall Street bankers came to embody 
1. She acknowledges in passing that overwork is a dominant feature for many lower and middle 
class workers so that bankers’ efforts to distinguish themselves by their grueling hours is a bit 
self serving.
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the market “as the ultimate ‘liquid’ employee”(252), exchanging compensation 
for job security. They were paid well for the uncertainty (riskiness) of what was 
more a financial relationship than a career (273).
A key feature of Wall Street compensation is the bonus. Although the Wall 
Street bonus has come under media scrutiny in the current financial crisis, the 
bonus is not well understood on Wall Street or in law practice. In the high 
flying days that preceded the crisis, bonuses were linked to “deal flow,” i.e., 
moving money, regardless of whether the transactions resulted in anything 
productive (268). Induced by the promises of the bonus, investment bankers 
strove to make the most out of the present, and in doing so created a “bubble 
culture of expediency,” devoid of long-term strategic thinking. The culture 
of smartness, overwork, and job insecurity combined with a compensation 
system rewarding expediency and liquidity to “enact shareholder value the 
way they [bankers] themselves experience it—through their own, Wall Street-
centric cultural lens…[is] detrimental to shareholder value in the long run” 
(293). Most importantly, Ho found that bonuses structured bankers’ lifestyles 
and the understanding of their own worth (263). It is no wonder, then, that 
bonuses still hold traction as a method of retaining talent in the face of the 
global financial meltdown.
There are parallels here to large law firm practice, of course. Job security 
has become more elusive. Compensation is hardly linked to performance as 
young associates are hired for what seem outrageous sums given their lack of 
substantive skill. Yet compensation at law firms lagged that of the investment 
banks at the time, suggesting that there may be more than a financial 
relationship at play in the case of law. While some young lawyers may make 
sense of the high starting salaries and job insecurity in large law firms as part of 
an exchange to pay back debt quickly, it is not clear that compensation in law 
demonstrates market forces in the same way as it does in investment banks. 
Other professional values, e.g., the value of “service,” may co-exist with the 
market to organize compensation in law.
The power of the Ho’s analysis comes from her insider status. But that 
insider status presents a weakness as well. As a member of the elite culture she 
attempts to critique, one wonders whether she, too, drank the Kool-Aid and 
perhaps overstates the significance of the investment bankers’ ability to shape 
the economy. Given that there is little context for the interviews and accounts 
she offers, it is hard to feel completely comfortable that the picture she paints 
covers investment banks as a whole or only the most elite among them. 
Moreover, there is no counterpoint to the banker’s frame, although clearly 
other elite professionals played a role in doing deals and surely challenged 
and/or further supported the framework that organizes the bankers’ work. 
Derivative product groups were beginning to emerge in Wall Street firms at 
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that time2 and one wonders whether the culture of the traders and the “quants” 
who were manufacturing and selling these products was different enough 
and significant enough to put competitive pressure, short-lived as it might 
be, on those doing deals. Without a picture of competition within the field, 
something seems missing from her analysis of investment bankers’ habitus that 
would strengthen our understanding of the persistence of the elite Wall Street 
culture she describes.
Taken on its own terms, the book demonstrates that the study of everyday 
work experiences can shed significant light on the power of institutions. 
Although scholars of the legal profession have addressed many of the issues 
discussed in the book, there are few contemporary ethnographies of large law 
firms that directly link workplace structures and strategies to the larger values 
and interest of the profession as a whole. Analyses of the kind and depth 
found in Ho’s Liquidity seem particularly important as we enter a “second 
transformation” of the legal profession.3 In the face of ever more market 
pressures in law, Ho’s analysis of elite investment banks leads us to ask what 
particular orientations and interests are being served by the culture of the large 
law firm. How are law firm structures and practices shaped by those interests 
and, in turn, in what ways do everyday routines reinforce those interests? Is 
law large law firm practice similarly focused on creating a worldview of elite 
importance irrespective of the work that is being done? Will large law firms 
find themselves hoisted on their own petard, temporarily, as Ho suggests was 
the fate of investment banks, only to re-emerge because of their elite status? 
What narratives and “origin myths” organize law practice, particularly at large 
law firms, to reinforce their sense of preeminence and importance?
2. See the various discussions in Frank Partnoy, FIASCO: Blood in the Water on Wall Street 
(W. W. Norton & Co. 2009); Charles R. Morris, The Two Trillion Dollar Meltdown (Public 
Affairs 2008); Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (W. W. Norton 
& Co. 2010); Gillian Tett, Fool’s Gold: How the Bold Dream of Small Tribe at J.P. Morgan 
Was Corrupted by Wallstreet Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe (Simon & Schuster 
2009).
3. Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: The Second Transformation 
of the Big Law Firm, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1867 (2008).
